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I 
The intense global debate on the Iraq-conflict was and is far more than a dispute over a regional problem. Rather 
it was a debate on fundamental questions of world order policy: Can international security and a fair development be 
achieved best in a unipolar system with only one hegemonic power, or in a multipolar world that is co-operatively 
regulated by international organisations, agreements and the norms set by them? How does international order 
emerge and in which ways can it be stabilised and aided: by force, by international law or by which combination of 
both instruments? Which purpose should the United Nations Organisation serve, and which regionally or globally 
limited role is Europe able and willing to play? Which peace and security strategies are appropriate to successfully 
deal with—or even solve—global challenges and regional conflicts? Can democracy be military distributed as an 
export commodity if necessary? Which concept of democracy should then be pursued? Will international security 
and regional order be aided by a growing number of transatlantic administrated de facto-protectorates or is there a 
convincing alternative? 
With the end of the East West Conflict in 1989, a turning point in world politics, these questions were put on the 
agenda. The terrorist attacks on 911 have advanced the debate and, from the perspective of the US, the entire 
process of the Iraq-conflict has led to temporary answers. This much can be assessed: The “short twentieth century,” 
starting with the failure of the old European balance of power in 1914 and concluding with the end of bipolarity, the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc in 1989/91, is a thing of the past. From a political view, we have 
been in the 21st century for a good dozen years already. In my opinion, the distribution of power, which will shape 
this century, still remains an open matter. 
The following introduces and illustrates two theses and a conclusion: 
1. The United States is on its way towards an “imperialistic hegemony.” If this is going to be a temporary or 
long-term structural development cannot be fully assessed yet. Looking at this in terms of politics of world order, in 
its current condition, the United States is a part of the problem as well as a part of the solution regarding 
international security. 
2. Old Europe—and the whole of Europe is old! is on the verge of becoming one pole and an independent player 
in international politics. Europe represents the actual alternative concept to the US’ policies regarding world order. 
If it is unable to unify politically or is split up by others, it will be, in all probability, marginalised in the future. 
3. In conclusion: Germany remains dependent on multilateralism but is has to define its national interests and 
priorities more clearly and has to give precedence to the European perspective in its foreign policy. 
In the following, the terms “hegemony” and “empire” are used based on Heinrich Triepel’s classic definition 
from his “Buch von führenden Staaten.”i According to Triepel, hegemony is a leadership relation that is based on 
conviction and acceptance. Hegemony can also be “soft” and “kind.” An empire however demands obedience and 
subjection and is based on orders and duress. 
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II 
It is undisputed after the end of the East West Conflict that the United States has the biggest military, economic 
and global political power potential. Not even among the different schools of thought within the United States there 
is a consensus on how to use this power. The Clinton and Bush senior administrations were dominated by 
conservative and liberal internationalists with their preference of co-operative multilateralism and a “soft 
hegemony,” although already under Clinton there was an increasing tendency towards unilateral guidelines. Since 
January, 2001 a new administration with a new strategy, based on a new societal coalition is in power. The current 
presidency bases its foreign policy on classic supporters of military power-politics, the petit bourgeois protestant 
fundamentalism, the “big business” especially the petrol-industry, as well as the neoconservative advocates of a self 
described democratic imperialism. This alliance reflects a continuous shift to the right of the whole political 
spectrum that has been going on since the seventies. This shift to the right can be interpreted in the sense of Ulrich 
Beck as a backlash to the undesirable modern age, to an increasingly fragmented pluralistic society and an unclear 
international system, thereby providing empirical confirmation of the thesis that a complicated range of problems 
can—under certain conditions—lead to overly simplified answers.ii 
The extreme republican right, which was to a great extent marginalised in the sixties has struggled to attain a 
temporary, though not a structural, capability of obtaining a majority. The current president convincingly represents 
partial identities of the new coalition, therefore his impact on domestic affairs should not be underestimated. He at 
least has sympathies for religious fundamentalism with its manichaean world view and he cultivates its rhetoric, he 
belongs rather through the benevolent favour of birth than through his own achievement to the big industry, he is a 
supporter of military power politics in the sense of Hans Morgenthau and he sympathises with the ideas of a 
fundamental and unilateral rearrangement of the international system as laid out in neoconservative concepts. 
Though residual elements of a realist conservative internationalism such as Secretary of State Colin Powell are still 
present, the alliance of democratic imperialists and the supporters of military power-politics has prevailed in the 
context of the Iraq-conflict.  
According to the democratic imperialists, the United States of America is a revolutionary democracy in terms of 
today’s world order. A revolutionary democracy enforces its political objectives unilaterally, depending on military 
force with little consideration for the consequences. Their policies are both opposed to crucial elements of the 
Westphalian System, which functioned for over 300 years, as well as to the international order which was decisively 
shaped by the US after 1945. According to Henry Kissinger, the master of scientific realism and conservative 
Realpolitik, they are also “entirely opposed to modern international law.”iii The democratic imperialists’ public 
debate, as to whether the Imperium Americanum is to be compared to the Roman or the British Empire, is not over 
yet.iv The concept itself is in the messianic tradition of US foreign policy but is also inspired by the friend-foe 
approach of Carl Schmitt and the normative absoluteness of Leo Strauss. It postulates the universal and exclusive 
claim for validity of US democracy and economic concepts.v 
III 
The central ideas of the new “Bush-Doctrine” are summarised in the “National Security Strategy of the United 
States of America”vi (NSS) from September 17, 2002: A document which, from an historic perspective, can be 
compared to the “National Security Memorandum (NSC) 68” (1950), which laid the foundations for the military 
Containment during the Cold War. The contents of the NSS are familiar and are therefore just briefly recalled at this 
point. Preventive strikes and wars on suspicion are explicitly recommended. The US can suspend sovereignty if it is 
safeguarding states that intend to produce weapons of mass destruction and could threaten American security. Non-
military security problems are neglected; the whole foreign policy militarised. Instead of alliances with regulated 
objectives and procedures, “coalitions of the willing,” as an expression of purely instrumental multilateralism, are 
supposed to pursue the objectives that are unilaterally determined by the United States. In order to develop the 
“unipolar moment” into a “unipolar era” (Charles Krauthammer), a “new American century,” vii  upcoming 
superpowers have to be prevented if necessary by military power projection from gaining equality to the US. 
International law and the United Nations are assigned a purely legitimising function, but only if they follow 
Washington’s guiding principles. Accordingly, the International Criminal Court (ICC) whose statute has been 
signed by 139 states and bindingly ratified by 92 states is rejected after being identified after international terrorism 
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and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction—as a danger to the United States’ national security. The 
United States places itself not only in this case outside the rule of law as a system ofüregulation of world order, but 
wants to vigorously force others to observe it. 
Only 911 has made this strategy capable of gaining a majority. But the programme is older, it was laid out for the 
first time in 1992 in the “Defence Policy Guidelines” by former Secretary of Defence, Cheney.viii The Iraq War was 
the first case to put the strategy to use. Nevertheless it is ignored or completely neglected that “modern nations can 
only develop if they are supported by emancipatory social ambitions. They cannot be put at international disposal 
but belong to the nations and people concerned.”ix There is a real danger that war under the premises of the new 
security strategy is still referred to as “ultima ratio” but in reality a quite intended process of adaptation starts or 
already has started at which end military interventions and war are one instrument among many. Regardless, the 
United States tends to understand every war as a “war of values,”x thereby morally inflating it. 
The battle for the public power over the public’s interpretation, after Vietnam the most relevant non-military 
challenge for security politics, was also pushed. The psychological warfare transmitted by mass-media before, 
during and after the Iraq-war created a controllable virtual reality that only partly corresponded with the empirical 
facts. Finally, an imperial language-use never known in the past 50 years of western co-operation belongs to the new 
self-image. Even friendly nations with differing policies are deemed as “irrelevant,” so they can either be 
“punished” or “ignored” in the future.xi The self-image of the Washington administration is: Those who are not with 
us, can and must be against us.  
IV 
Europe lost its “central strategic position”xii for the United States after the end of the East West conflict. The US’ 
focus shifted to the Asia-Pacific region and the “Greater Middle East,” in the US’ understanding the axis of crisis 
from Morocco to Afghanistan. Nevertheless the US perceives the European Union as a developing pole of 
international politics and next to the Peoples’ Republic of China as a future challenge to US hegemony. While the 
Clinton administration benevolently took note of the European Union’s political integration and aimed at continuous 
co-operation, the current administration primarily sees Europe as a recruiting pool for “coalitions of the willing” and 
launches various attempts to undermine a common foreign and defence policy. Especially democratic imperialists 
look down on the European concept for a world order with contempt. They are not willing to allow Europe a claim 
to shape transatlantic relations, as it was common during the time of the East West conflict. The day might come, if 
it is not here already, when Americans pay no more attention to the remarks of the EU than to remarks of ASEAN or 
the Andes Pact, Robert Kagan writes in his much noted essay “Of Paradise and Power. America and Europe in the 
New World Order.”xiii It is doubtful whether on this basis the “old West” still exists as a community of values.xiv 
Imperial hegemony and equal co-operation do not fit together.  
V 
But how realistic is the goal of imperial hegemony actually? It only partly corresponds with reality. The 
international system is unipolar only from a military point of view. This unipolarity has an effect on the political 
power constellation, which is basically multipolar but the hegemonic US power projection is superimposed upon it. 
The economic world is itself multipolar, so is the world of social interaction, which encouraged by the revolution in 
communication technologies is reflected in an expansive variety of transnational relations, as recently demonstrated 
by the international terrorist networks. Furthermore, there are reasonable doubts about the American model of 
democracy. Christian Tomuschat observes: “As impressive as the US record in the field of foreign policy, as dark 
are the shadows that the time of the Cold War cast on the reputation of the superpower. every military tyranny was 
supported without reservations, especially in South America (but not only there, M.S.). The United States are not 
accepted as a messenger and advocate of democracy almost anywhere in the world” says Tomuschat. “There will be 
no new hegemonic world order, at most a hegemonic state of power.”xv The opinion of the vast majority of the 
world’s societies is that no nation is “chosen” and none is “destined to lead.”  
Since its intellectual realisation, humankind has been seeking immortality. Since the emergence of a nation state 
system, states have sought hegemony. In the history of humankind and the development of the nation state system it 
has not been possible to come closer to the objectives of immortality and lasting hegemony. It is hard to argue for 
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that this will change fundamentally. However, it is empirically proven and by realistic and neorealistic schools of 
thought explained theoretically that every attempt to erect a unipolar or hegemonic position of power has regularly 
led to the establishment of countervailing power.xvi Already Leopold von Ranke emphasised that it is not within the 
nature of the “main powers to limit themselves, the frontiers have to be set by others.” Historically, hubris can be the 
first step towards decline. From the viewpoint of political science the “arrogance of power,” an imperial dominance 
of hegemony, directly leads to the formation of a countervailing power. 
The omnipotence of the US military contains an oppressive danger: Who can guarantee that the American people 
will always elect a level-headed president into office? Crises could bring an aggressive populist into the White 
House, against whom the acting president would appear like a choirboy. This scenario is abstract but clever politics 
do not wait until it becomes actuality. Even a good hegemon carries the nucleus of tyranny within himself. 
Overreaching power can tempt one to misuse that power. It is not necessary for a secure world order that the USA 
within a few years will spend more money on armament than all other nations in the world combined. Therefore the 
United States has to be re-integrated into a functioning international system. 
In the interest of international security Werner Link and other representatives of neorealism plead for countering 
the American strive for hegemony by forming a countervailing power until the US’ society has stopped on its path 
towards an “imperial republic.” They rightly forecast that the victory against Iraq will extend the American Empire, 
but will also mobilise a growing opposition to this empire.xvii The emergence of a countervailing power became 
apparent in the first months of 2003 when France, Germany, Russia and China gave direction to the resistance 
against the US Iraq policy. This ad hoc co-operation has made an impact. It is not unlikely that it will repeat itself in 
a comparable situation if the issue of principles of world order are on the agenda again. In the eyes of a liberal 
institutionalist however, this co-operation represents a minimal consensus and a makeshift, a fallback to classic 
balance of power policies than a counter model with respect to content. 
VI 
The European Union as a democratic community of peace and shared values is the most likely to adapt a concept 
of co-operative counterweight. If it becomes capable of acting in the field of foreign and security politics, it has the 
best chance to establish itself as a co-operative countervailing power and thus correct the hegemony of the United 
States of America.xviii This requires a common policy which makes it apparent that both the analysis of possible 
threats and even more the derived security strategies of Europe and the US differ. In the view of the EU, more and 
more foreign policy is developing into “world’s domestic politics” as Carl-Friedrich von Weizs cker already said 
more than thirty years ago. World’s domestic politics can only function with the institutions and the means of 
multilateral politics. 
The basic positions, in view of the importance of multilaterally designed and commonly binding rules for the 
world order, are widely separated from each other on both sides of the Atlantic. While the revolutionary democracy 
equates its own national security interest with the world’s security interest, Europe in its vast majority holds on to 
the existing system of world order and international law to improve it evolutionarily. In this respect historical 
experiences continue to have an effect. “Each of the big European nations” as Jacques Derrida and J rgen Habermas 
wrote in a recently published manifesto “has been in the prime of experiencing imperial expansion and had to handle 
the experience of the loss of this empire. With a growing distance to imperial rule and colonial history, the European 
powers had the chance to adopt a reflexive distance from themselves. They were able to learn to perceive 
themselves from the perspective of losers in the doubtful role as victors, that were called to account for an uprooting 
modernisation imposed by violence. This could have advanced the renunciation from euro-centrism and quickened 
the Kantian hope for a world domestic policy.”xix 
Federal president Johannes Rau put the European attitude toward the further development of international law in 
his “Berlin Speech” as follows: “International law has to be further developed, where it acts as a law against the 
people, because it protects dictatorial governments that mistreat their people, and where there are no adequate 
answers to the new challenges as of yet, as in the possible connection of international terrorism and weapons of 
mass destruction. With all consideration for reform, it has to be ensured that also in the future no state by itself can 
claim the right for intervention.”xx This consequence does not result from European weakness but from a deeper 
insight into the necessities of an interdependent world. In Immanuel Kant’s words: For the states in their relation to 
each other, there cannot be any reasonable way out of the lawless condition which contains only war except that 
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they, like individual men, should give up their savage (lawless) freedom, adjust themselves to the constraints of 
public law, and thus establish a continuously growing state consisting of various nations, which will ultimately 
include all the nations of the world.xxi Instead of “continuously growing state” it is also possible to say “United 
Nations.” 
VII 
So what is “old Europe”? “Old Europe” as centre of the world, as Stefan Zweig described it in his autobiography 
“Die Welt von gestern” perished irrevocably in 1914. At the beginning of the 21st  century the coalescence of old 
and new democracies and the determination of collective interests are relevant. As a “civil power” the European 
Union politically, economically and with its cultural diversity reveals a global magnetism, which is comparable to 
the United States. From the outside the European Union is perceived much more as a global actor than most 
Europeans are aware. The “European way” of finding compromises, dialogue and conflict prevention should not be 
idealised. It cannot be understood without the experience of terrible wars over many centuries, which is still alive in 
the collective memory of the European people. Habermas and Derrida interpreted this identity that evolved from this 
European experience as follows: “A culture which has over centuries been torn apart much more than others by 
conflicts between urban and rural areas, by clerical and secular powers, by the competition between belief and 
knowledge, and by the battle of political rules and antagonistic classes had to painfully learn how to communicate 
differences, institutionalise contrasts and stabilise frictions. The appreciation of differences the mutual appreciation 
of the other in his otherness can become characteristic for a shared identity.”xxii 
It remains correct, that out of conviction the right consequences were drawn from the experiences of the past, 
including the completion of the European integration in the Centre and the East of the continent. Demarcation also 
belongs to the formation of identity: In the European case demarcation to Russia, demarcation to non-European 
Islamic states, demarcation to America. Demarcation is not to be equated with separation. Link has pointed out that 
European “Atlanticists” would, with the warning that Europe should not and cannot be built up against the USA, try 
to “discredit a co-operative policy of balance as a counterpart to America as an antagonistic policy of balance and 
therefore use the” propaganda-club “of anti-Americanism allegations.” Link continues: “As absurd as this is, an 
independent European policy will not be met with approval by the United States. The Franco-German treaty of 
friendship, the Franco-German Brigade rather the Euro Corps were accomplished by Adenauer/de Gaulle and 
Kohl/Mitterand against the US government’s and the Antlanticists’ resistance.”xxiii 
The United States of America is different from Europe. Regardless they are in line with us in their values, their 
constitution and their historic roots like no other part of the world. It would always be the best and most effective for 
world order politics if the United States and Europe were pursuing joint or co-ordinated strategies. Therefore, it 
seems incorrect and premature to reduce transatlantic relations to the security co-operation within NATO. 
Transatlantic relations as a whole are multidimensional and closely tied: politically in all areas, economically not 
only due to enormous direct investments on both sides of the Atlantic, academically, culturally, and in the world of 
everyday life and the relationships of the people. The development of a co-operative countervailing power does not 
put this reality of close ties aside. Instead it aims at accomplishing in political relations, what has been achieved in 
economic relations, namely an approximate balance and power of negotiation. According to the conclusions of 
theory, integration is generated by functional necessities, by pressure from the outside and by the political will of the 
elite. With respect to the European Union, all three conditions are present today.  
VIII 
Three models can be taken into consideration for the build-up and the improvement of the EU-states’ capacity to 
act within the sphere of foreign and security policy: (1) a deeper co-operation including all member states of the 
EU,  (2) using the instrument of “structured co-operation” or in other words the modelling of a core-group 
following the example of the European Monetary Union, (3) the integration of security politics of states outside the 
European Union following the model of the “Schengen Agreement” for the protection of external frontiers. 
1. A comprehensive integration of foreign and security policies 
In its draft treaty for a constitutionxxiv on 13th June, 2003 the European Convention agreed on creating an office 
for a Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, assisted by an independent European diplomatic service. This Union 
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Minister for Foreign affairs will unite in his position the present functions of the High Representative for the 
European Defence and Security Policy and of the Commissioner responsible for external relations. He will be the 
permanent President of the Foreign Affairs Council and at the same time Vice-President of the Commission. 
Nevertheless the Convention’s draft sticks to the principle of unanimity in all matters of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy. The attempt to also introduce “super-qualified” majority decisions in this political field for instance 
by a quorum of two thirds of the states and four fifths of the population failed because of British resistance. Still, 
some progress was achieved: The draft emphasises solidarity in foreign policy and provides that the member states 
“shall refrain from action contrary to the Union’s interest or likely to impair its effectiveness.” (Art. I-15-2) In the 
future all EU members are obliged to consult partner states “on any foreign and security policy issue which is of 
general interest” (Art. I-39-5) before they take a position on such an issue. A clause for mutual assistance was 
agreed on for the case of terrorist attacks or catastrophes. A European Armaments, Research and Capabilities 
Agency will also be established, as proposed by Germany and France.  
These are not at all bad results considering the dissension within the European Union during the first phase of the 
Iraq conflict. Obviously all parties involved are basically interested in a deeper co-operation and the development of 
a common diplomatic culture. With the new requirements for consultation the Union can avoid as in the second half 
of 2002 concerning Iraq making a fundamental foreign policy issue a subject of internal dissent. The European 
Defence and Security Policy, in which all EU-states except Denmark participate, has developed a dynamic with the 
missions in Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, that could not have been 
expected a year ago. The work on a European security strategy, which follows the specific security profile of the 
ESDP and pleads for regulated multilateralism is successfully completed. A European Defence and Security Policy 
has been supported by more than 70% of the EU states’ population for many years.xxv The concepts and instruments 
for a comprehensive security provision are increasingly available. Nevertheless, and that is the actual problem, 
adherence to the principle of unanimity threatens to complicate or prevent the Union’s capacity to act in crisis 
situations. To obtain this capacity to act, majority decisions have to be enforced in the future. If this is not 
accomplished during the now following negotiations and this doesn’t seem to be the case due to the tough stance 
taken by the United Kingdom and others integration will occur at different speeds and in different forms in the 
foreign and security policies in a European Union with 25, 27 or 28 members; if not the most reluctant member shall 
determine the speed of the integration process. 
2. A “European Security and Defence Union” within the EU 
The Union’s constitution provides the instrument of “enhanced or structured co-operation” for such a case. Its 
aim must be “to further the objectives of the Union, protect its interests and reinforce its integration process.” (Art. 
I-43-1) A minimum of a third of the EU members has to participate; the non-participating states can join the 
consultations without voting rights. If the European Union as a whole is not willing to take the next step with a 
sufficient determination to achieve the capacity to act in the security policy, then it would only be logical if the 
willing member states lead the way with a ESDU. It remains decisive that the future participation of others will not 
be ruled out and that those who are not yet willing to integrate do not obstruct those who are determined to 
participate in an enhanced security and particularly defence policy. 
The Franco-German co-operation is the basis for such a “core Europe.”xxvi Former Federal chancellor Helmut 
Schmidt has recently described this partnership as a “strategic principle” and further noticed: “A vital representation 
of German national interests in the 21st century is not possible in almost any field of international politics or global 
economy without a functioning and reliable entente with France.”xxvii Forty percent of the European GNP falls to 
Germany and France as well as forty percent of its defence expenses. Adding Greece, Belgium and Luxembourg, 
alone these five supporters of the “Brussels Initiative”xxviii from April, 2003 make up half of the added European 
defence budget. Further founding members such as the Netherlands, Italy or Spain, could be won over as 
participants for an enhanced co-operation in the security policy. British participation is always desired but not a 
conditio sine qua non for every further advancement.  
The tasks of such an enhanced co-operation are known and already being tackled in part. This includes the link-
up of strategic reconnaissance, the creation of a strategic European Air Transport Command and a combined NBC-
defence capability, the establishment of European training centres, further cross-national interlocking of armed 
forces in the sense of assets and capabilities, and the establishment of a military command structure for autonomous 
EU military missions including mobile headquarters essentially creating a general staff. In view of the extension of 
the European Union and the very different capability and willingness to integrate the new member states, all 
Michael Staack / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 2 (2010) 7509–7516 7515
arguments speak for the use of “enhanced co-operation” as long as the pursued objectives cannot be agreed on 
among all members. 
3. A ESDU outside the European Union 
Only if an enhanced co-operation cannot be achieved within the Union, it should then be possible to fall back on 
the option of a “European Security and Defence Union” outside the EU structures. This course is not desirable but 
has to be maintained as a last resort for the case of an adverse blockade policy against further improvement of the 
co-operation in defence policy. In the current situation a ESDU outside the EU is only conceivable for one case: if 
all efforts for strengthening the co-operation in foreign and defence policies within the Union fail.  
IX 
The experiences of the Iraq debate have indicated that the new EU members from Central and Eastern Europe 
joining in 2004, still have to be won over for the contractually determined perspective of a Union which is 
constantly co-operating closer. For most of these states the accentuation of their sovereignty, regained after 1989, a 
historically founded distrust towards Russia and dependence on the USA in terms of armament policy is for the time 
being more important than the European Union’s capability to act in foreign and security policies. Due to their own 
experiences with dictatorship their political and lawful threshold for the removal of unjust rule differs from that of 
old Western Europe. However, they have experience with the policy of a dominating superpower. First signs of a 
change in approach could be noticed during bilateral talks after the war in Iraq and the final phase of the European 
Convention. Poland’s first democratic prime minister Tadeusz Masowiecki has pointed out that there was no 
discussion about the objectives and mandate of the Iraq-operation“in his country.” Masowiecki continues: “That we 
owe so much to America should not lead to political automatism.”xxix The task of winning over the Central and 
Eastern European states for a substantial foreign policy perspective in the Union was obviously underestimated. 
Therefore, an intelligent mixtum compositum of intensive conviction and “European socialisation,” an integration 
policy which is drawing on a plethora of positive experiences is required from now on. This demand does not just 
apply to strategic political action but also to societies’ awareness. 
Activation of the “Weimar Triangle” of Germany, France and Poland provides an important instrument for new 
alliances within the European Union. The Franco-German tandem remains indispensable for deepening the 
integration but is no longer enough. Poland should be treated as a partner with equal weight, at eye-level within the 
“Weimar Triangle.” This is a concession, but a concession that promises returns. Poland has more inhabitants than 
all other pre-accession countries of 2004 together: among them it has by far the biggest economic power, strives for 
a historically founded ambitious foreign policy profile and its volume of foreign trade with the EU states amounts to 
15 times that with the USA.xxx If Poland can be won over for a deeper integration perspective in foreign policy, most 
of the other pre-accession countries will follow and will prefer the European Union to an “overextended NATO” 
which is restricted only to military security. Otherwise Great Britain will have an important and perhaps long-term 
ally for the objective of a European Union which is essentially limited to free trade. 
X 
In the Iraq conflict Germany pursued a world order policy that was resolute in its content but not always 
successful in its realisation. It corresponded with the normative guidelines of its constitution, of the UN-Charter and 
its national interests. This policy was held in great esteem world-wide. For Germany the constitution ranks higher 
than the US National Security Strategy.  
In the perspective of world order it would be best if the USA and Europe pursued joint and co-ordinated 
strategies. Germany also has a strong interest in such joint strategies. If the US and Germany share common 
interests, such as the fight against terror and the implementation of the “Road Map” for the Middle East, co-
operation should be sought after and persistently pursued. Where there are different views on fundamental issues, 
these should also be settled in the future, if possible not bilaterally but in a European context. 
Kennedy’s forty-year-old vision of transatlantic relations which rest on two pillars remains correct. It is up to the 
Europeans to lead the process of defining roles and interests to an end and act accordingly. Germany must first 
define its interest nationally, but it can only pursue them internationally in a European context. Developing the 
European Union’s capacity to act remains the most important German national interest.  
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Germany is a regional power with global interests and global responsibility. Within the last couple of years, it is 
in the process of developing a global outlook and a new strategic culture. For Germany as well as the European 
Union, political and economic relations with the leading powers in Asia i.e. China, India, Japan, Indonesia and the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations are of growing importance. With its European Security Strategy, the 
European Union has defined its ambition to establish new strategic relationships. The common economic interests 
with major nations in Asia are obvious. World order policy, international security and regional conflict resolution 
are other issue areas for a deepened cooperation. 
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